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The question whether Israel has a legal right to exist might appear to be one of 
the most emotively charged in the vocabulary of international law and politics. 
It evokes immediately the ‘exterminationist’ rhetoric of numerous Arab and 
Islamic politicians and ideologues, not least the present President of Iran. Yet in 
the perhaps overly cool and detached world of analytical legal positivism, the 
proposition ‘Israel has a right to exist’ can only be taken to mean that there is 
an international legal order, which confers this right on Israel. If there is no 
international legal order, then Israel, no more and no less than any other country, 
cannot be said to have a legal right to exist. This may be no more than a 
Hobbesian assertion that states exist as wolves towards one another in a state of 
nature. For instance in 1966 in a debate in the Security Council the Israeli 
Representative said: 
 
Whatever we do, whatever our Government decides to do, is done in order to defend 
and protect our national independence and our national security – on the sole 
responsibility of our Government and not on behalf of anybody else or on behalf of 
any consideration but our own.1 
 
In recent times, Premier Netanyahu has repeated this language, viz Israel must be 
the master of its fate, the Jewish state exists to protect the Jewish people etc. 
The existence of a legal order supposes some criteria, any criteria, of legitimacy, 
that somehow authorise decision-makers to engage in effective projects of 
order whatever their merits. If these conditions are not met, it is intellectually 
more honest to accept that we find ourselves in the absence of any international 
legal order. In this case, the dynamic or drive underlying state actions is for the 
state to sustain and preserve itself precisely with the same independent force and 
energy with which it originally established itself. This is a meta-legal drive which 
finds expression among international lawyers when they say that the existence of 
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1 21st year, 1321st Meeting, UN doc.S/O.V.1321, 17, quoted by D. Bowett, ‘Reprisals involving 
recourse to armed force’ (1972) 66 AJIL 1, 6. 
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a state is a question of fact. Israel itself used this argument against the request for 
an advisory opinion on the status of Palestine in 1948, saying, ‘The existence of 
a State is a question of fact and not of law. The criterion of statehood is not 
legitimacy but effectiveness’.2 This fact is central to an analysis of international 
relations from a critical perspective, because it prepares one for the compulsive, 
repetitive nature of the lust of states for security, a mark of all states and a 
fundamental characteristic of inter-state relations.3A state may have an individual 
self-referring drive of legitimacy such as ‘Manifest Destiny’, but this will not offer, 
or even try to offer, a convincing basis for any international communal living. 
The question which will be asked of Kattan’s book is whether it demonstrates, 
as he intends, a series of illegalities in the construction of Israel and in the 
destruction of the Palestinian people, or whether, instead, it demonstrates a legal 
vacuum which Israel itself reaffirms in Netanyahu’s fighting rhetoric. In the latter 
event, is there a way to reconstruct from scratch a legal conceptual framework for 
Palestine and what would be the best forum in which to achieve this? 
 
 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEAGUE MANDATE OF PALESTINE 
AND ITS JEWISH HOME 
 
Given the subtitle of the book one can expect its 261 pages of text and 105 pages 
of densely filled footnotes to show that these events are illegal, contravening 
international law. In Kattan’s view, the flouting and manipulation of international 
law are the cause of the present continuing violence. Kattan bases his legal 
argument around a pillar, that the Mandate territory of Palestine was included in 
territories promised to the Arabs during the First World War, an implementation 
of self-determination according to the MacMahon Letter.4 This promise was not 
fulfilled in relation to Palestine. Instead a Jewish Home was forcibly constructed 
in contravention of legal principles. From National Archive Records, Kattan 
quotes Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, admitting that, ‘The weak 
point of our position, of course, is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately 
and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present 
inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish 
verdict’ (121). Balfour qualifies his statement with the assurance that the Jewish 
home should be provided without dispossessing or oppressing the present population, 
but from the start it is never indicated how these dual objectives are to be 
 
 
 
2 Abba Eban arguing before the Security Council, cited by James Crawford, in The Creation of States 
in International Law (Oxford:OUP,2nd ed,2006) 3.Crawford describes Eban as the Foreign Minister, 
at that time he was Israeli Representative at the UN. 
3 See above all, J. Derrida, ‘The Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ 1990 (11) 
Cardozo Law Review 919; also D. Campbell, Writing Security, United States Foreign Policy and the Politics 
of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 
4 The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, Chapter 4, see especially 46. Kattan quotes the MacMahon 
letter, of October 1915, to Sherif Hussain of Mecca, the main spokesman for the Pan Arab cause, 
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recognising the principle of Arab independence in purely Arab territory – which Palestine was at that 
time. As will be seen, in spite of this pledge, the post 1918 Mandate of Palestine included, at British 
direction, a pledge to provide a Jewish homeland. MacMahon was the British High Commissioner in 
Cairo acting under the instruction of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. 
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achieved. What is the logic behind requiring 700,000 Palestinian Arabs to accept 
the entry for the first time of 700,000 Jews in the same ‘homeland’? 
In 1939, a British Government White Paper stated there should be a ‘State in 
which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government 
in such a way that the essential interests of each are shared’ (122).This is a goal that 
there could never have been any prospect of achieving. There had been riots in 
Jerusalem in 1920 and a British Court of Inquiry concluded in an 82-page report 
that the cause of the rioting was the disappointment at the non-fulfillment 
of promises made by British propaganda, and more specifically ‘the inability to 
reconcile the Allies’ declared policy of self-determination with the Balfour 
Declaration, giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense anxiety for their [Arab] 
future; . . . fear of Jewish competition and domination, justified by experience and 
the apparent control exercised by the Zionists over the administration’ (83–85). 
This report was drawn up by Generals of the British Army in Egypt advised by a 
Court of Appeal judge. Kattan stresses that, one of the first things that Herbert 
Samuel did when he took over Palestine as its first High Commissioner ‘was to 
ensure that the findings of the inquiry never saw the light of day’ (85). 
So Balfour writes to Lord Curzon, his successor as Foreign Secretary, a memo 
which is worth quoting in full because it is an express avowal that there is no 
normative coherence whatever in what Britain, with the consent of the other 
Great Powers, is proposing and executing in Palestine: 
 
The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is 
even more flagrant in the case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine than in the 
‘independent nation’ of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose to go through the 
form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country . . .The four 
Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good 
or bad, is rooted in an age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes of far 
profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,00 Arabs who now 
inhabit that ancient land.5 
 
In other words, there was never a normatively coherent project of governance in 
relation to Palestine. Curzon, as Kattan points out, commented along the same 
lines. Agreeing with the objection that Arabs in Palestine should not be described 
as ‘non-Jewish communities’, he said he had never been consulted about the 
Mandate and ‘I think the entire conception is wrong’ (123).A document is drawn 
up, he continues, which is an avowed constitution of a Jewish State, where there 
are 585,000 Arabs and 60,000 Jews. That said, all Curzon can conclude is that he 
wishes there was an alternative. Curzon repeated the argument that the Jews had 
no legal claim to Palestine and that the provision of a National Home in Palestine 
was ‘not the same thing as the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish National 
Home – an extension of the phrase for which there was no justification’ (124). 
However, Curzon did not, nor did subsequent British leaders, explain how the 
4 
 
two notions were to be kept distinct in Jewish, Zionist eyes (124–125). 
 
 
 
5 at (123). This is a very well known document. Its reference is FO 371/4183 (11 August 1919) 
Balfour to Curzon, but as Kattan notes, it is reproduced in E. L.Woodward and R. Butler (eds), 
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 (London: HMSO, 1952) 345. 
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Having set out scrupulously and with little comment this bizarre British record 
of admissions that the principle of self-determination was being flouted in the case 
of the Palestinians, Kattan goes on to construct what he thinks are legal arguments. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are central to Kattan setting out a right to self-determination 
of the people of Palestine. This is extremely valuable as a history or chronology of 
institutional events, the acts of British administration, the conduct of the League of 
Nations, and the role of the UN General Assembly. It is difficult to read because 
there are about 20 pages of corresponding narrative in footnotes from 308 to 328 
and the book can only be read with two page markers in place. This incongruity 
has a very basic conceptual explanation. These materials are not easily distinguishable 
as legally significant simply because there is no legal order to encompass them, 
but merely what I call institutional activity, none of it authoritative. 
The key argument Kattan could well have chosen to see as most useful is 
presented by the Institute of International Law at its meeting in Cambridge in 
1931. It passed a resolution on the legal significance of Mandates, which is hidden 
on page 312 of Kattan’s footnotes, thereby revealing his lack of a clear concept of 
the international legal order which might protect the Palestinians: 
 
5. [. . .] The powers conferred upon the mandatory are in the exclusive interest of 
the population subject to Mandate . . . 
6. [. . .] The communities under Mandate are subjects of international law[.] 
7. The functions of the mandatory end by renunciation or revocation of the 
Mandate . . . by the recognition of the independence of the community which has 
been under Mandate. 
8. [. . .]The rights and duties of the communities under Mandate are not affected by 
the expiration of the mandate or the change of the Mandatory. 
 
Kattan could have tried to argue that such a resolution constituted fundamental 
principles recognised by the juridical conscience of mankind, a kind of ius cogens 
against which should be measured the institutional practices he describes in 
such detail. Yet instead, in the search for binding positive law – as if there were 
an international legislature or even a customary law community with a will to 
enforce its choices – he tries to pick out legal crumbs here and there which could 
support the claim that at least the Palestinians in Palestine also have the right 
to self-determination which the Israelis/Jews succeeded in exercising in 1948. 
Perhaps a key stage in his argument is the citation of a British Foreign Office 
Legal Minute which says that the political position of the Palestine Arabs had to 
be legally respected (132).This would be no more than what Robbie Sabel argues 
in his long review of Kattan’s book, where he says: 
 
5 
 
by 1947 both the Jewish and the Palestinian peoples had the right to create 
independent states in Western Palestine. The Jewish population utilized this right, the 
Palestinians have not yet done so and the border between the states will have to be 
negotiated between the parties.6 
 
 
 
 
 
6 R. Sabel, (2010) 21 EJIL 1103, 1107. 
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Kattan vacillates between legal arguments in a positivist sense and arguments 
based upon equity and proportionality. So he asks whether the Mandate itself 
constituted a right to self-determination for the people of Palestine but has to 
face the fact that the phrase was left out precisely because of the intention to 
introduce Jews into the territory. Then he asks whether the Mandate permitted 
partition, whether the UN General Assembly or the Mandatory Power had 
legal authority to partition the Mandate. These questions could only have legal 
meaning if there was an international legal community, with a legal will and a 
determination to exercise it. 
It is possible to read Kattan as favouring a fair two state solution, not excluded 
by Sabel, but also not guaranteed by him. Then Kattan’s history is very telling in 
terms of the inequities in the weight accorded to the Jewish population at the 
time of the General Assembly Partition Resolution. The disproportion of the two 
populations in terms of the territory and quality of territory allocated to the two 
groups, Jews and Palestinian Arabs, was enormous. As a matter of history Kattan 
realistically shows that this European/North American initiative had to do with 
making more space for European Jewish survivors of the Holocaust finding their 
way out of the Euro-Atlantic area to Palestine. Certainly, there was no UN 
consensus on the Partition Plan and not only Arab nations boycotted it. The Plan 
was a recommendation not enforced by the Security Council, but, historically, 
this is to ignore the legitimacy which it gave to the Jewish cause in Palestine in 
the eyes of Europeans and North Americans. That remains a hard political fact 
today. Kattan does not connect this fact clearly with what he calls the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict in chapter 7. 
Kattan goes on to use by analogy arguments from principles of international 
nationality law as well as Palestinian citizenship law to show that the Partition 
Plan was not fair. Even of the one third of the Palestine population which was 
Jewish, very many were recent arrivals and did not have Palestinian citizenship 
under Mandate law. Their connection with the territory was very much less than 
that of the Palestinian Arabs (141–142). These are important elements of an 
argument about equity, but they lose their real – not to mention positive legal – 
force once the political context is recognised. The Arab stance was that no Jewish 
immigration since 1920 should ever have taken place and the Jewish stance, also 
in 1948, was that its immigration was only beginning. The question was one of 
power. Could the Arabs stop the immigration? The purpose of the Mandate was 
to make this legally impossible in British hands. Could the Jews be stopped? Their 
purpose in ending the Mandate was to ensure that they could not be. 
From the perspective of international law as a system of world governance, 
6 
 
the circumstances of Britain’s withdraw from Palestine should receive a lot of 
attention. However, Kattan’s obsession with proving that the Palestinian Arabs have 
rights, such as self-determination, leads him to take his eye off the conduct of 
Britain in the last days of the Mandate. The cumulative effect of events, such as the 
Mandatory power simply abandoning the territory of Palestine without providing 
for any transitional arrangements, a so-called United Nations General Assembly 
making recommendations for partition which it had no intention of trying to 
implement and a Security Council which also had no interest in implementing the 
General Assembly Resolution, together created a vacuum of power in Palestine. 
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In his recent work, Quigley addresses the institutional practices which make 
this vacuum obvious.7 The end of the tragic circus of British rule in Palestine 
were the so-called Morrison and Bevin Plans. The former proposed a strong 
central government for Palestine, with initially a British High Commissioner in 
charge, and two Provinces, with Jews and Arabs having considerable autonomy, 
and, particularly, control of immigration. The Arabs rejected this. The Bevin Plan 
proposed a five-year trusteeship, with a constituent assembly after four years and 
a High Commissioner who would take steps to set up an independent state. With 
breathtaking aplomb, the British Government announced that it had always been 
the British Government’s intention ‘to lay the foundations for an independent 
Palestinian State in which the Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights’.8 When 
these fine sentiments elicited a generally negative response in the atmosphere of 
Palestine in February 1947, the British simply gave notice, in Quigley’s words, ‘to 
terminate the mandate unilaterally, even if no governing mechanisms could be 
put in place.’9 Quigley records that British Cabinet discussions of the subsequent 
UN Partition Plan evoked horror in the minds of Foreign Secretary Bevin 
and British UN Representative Sir Andrew Cadogan. The latter thought that 
something so manifestly unjust to the Arabs would be difficult to reconcile with 
British consciences. However, Quigley notes that Cadogan expressed no reservations 
openly at the United Nations.10 
The British Mandate ended as thoughtlessly and as confusedly as it had begun. 
What Kattan fails to highlight is that, having imposed the Jews on the Palestinian 
Arabs without their consent, while expressing vague hopes that the two communities 
would somehow ‘treat one another fairly’, they, the British, left the 
Palestinian Arabs to cope as best they could with the Jews, once they, the British, 
were satisfied that the two communities were irreconcilably opposed to one 
another. The additional contribution of the UN General Assembly was to make 
a recommendation for partition which it could hardly have expected the two 
communities in Palestine simply to implement by themselves on the ground, so 
to speak. This nonsense marks the true face of international law. In analytical legal 
terms, already outlined, it does not qualify as a true system of law. To try to extract 
crumbs of legality for the Palestinian Arabs out of such ludicrous international 
institutional irresponsibility is to misunderstand the nature of international legal 
7 
 
society. It simply does not exist. 
In this context of skepticism about the existence of an international legal 
order, there may be some interest in reflecting on the extensive review attention 
Kattan’s book has received. Not surprisingly, there is a certain skepticism as to 
whether legal argument can contribute constructively to the resolution of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. In the Journal of the History of International Law, Jean Allain 
 
 
 
7 J. Quigley, The Statehood of Palestine, International Law and The Middle East Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2010) Parts I and II. 
8 ibid quoted at 89. One could argue that Palestinian Arab leadership was perversely opposed (see 
Karsh, note 35 below) but that does not cover the issue why they should accept a program of Jewish 
immigration in the first place, a denial of their autonomy in Palestine – and so on, pointing to a 
failure of international governance and not just international law. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid 91. 
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contests the usefulness of the international law argument, concluding his review 
with the remarks: 
 
In fact the book is a page turner, but its use of international law is instrumental as 
‘lawfare’: a further salvo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict . . . [which] will have little 
impact in the long run . . .To argue that the Palestinian side of the equation always 
had international law on its side, and this is the only measuring stick, makes this study 
a polemic to be shelved alongside Boyle and Dershowitz’.11 
 
 
If Allain means Kattan’s book will not weaken the resolve of Netanyahu to 
ensure that Israel remains master of its fate, he is right. 
Exactly the same type of criticism is made in the Times Literary Supplement. In 
an essay entitled ‘Public Intellectuals and the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Neil Caplan 
protests at the very idea of law providing an answer with his subtitle ‘Is it the role 
of scholars to pronounce on the rights and wrongs of this complex and protracted 
dispute?’12 Caplan criticises Kattan, while careful also to criticise a pro-Israeli 
scholar Efraim Karsh at the same time, for wishing to have his research contribute 
to today’s unresolved debates between Israelis and Palestinians. This is presumably 
to deny the possibility of legal resolution of the conflict. So Caplan continues, 
elaborating on a word used by Allain, that Kattan’s book is ‘lawfare’, ‘the use of 
law and legal skills as a means of advancing a political agenda’. Effectively, Caplan 
is challenging the very idea of legal argument in public affairs. 
It is probably the intention of both authors to say that any venture into the fray 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict will appear partisan to whatever side the author 
opposes, and that, therefore, the academic should stay out of it. This might make 
sense to a political scientist or historian such as Caplan who feels, as an outsider, 
that international law arguments are not realistically compelling, by whichever 
side they are used. However, Allain’s argument is more grave. It is Kattan’s failure 
to understand the development of the history of international law which makes 
Kattan biased and therefore unprofessional. To reach this conclusion, Allain has to 
8 
 
endorse the position that international law was an instrument of colonialism, a 
tool of the colonial powers, and, for this reason, cannot be used to argue in legal 
terms against these powers and their beneficiaries. 
So Allain insists on Kattan’s failure to realise the historically relative character 
of international law. It sanctioned, by the standards of the time, the conduct of 
those, such as Britain, that Kattan wishes to criticise. At the time, European Public 
Law made a distinction between ‘civilised nations’ and those beyond the Pale, 
which allowed for a colonial venture in Palestine. Allain concludes that the book 
is ‘not a historical study per se’, meaning that Kattan does not recognise that at the 
dawn of the 20th century, ie presumably more than 40 years before the time of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation of Israel, international law was merely a 
European Public Law, which distinguished ‘civilised nations’ and those beyond 
the Pale. By a lack of a sense of history, Allain means precisely that Kattan has 
forgotten the Inter-temporal rule – whereby questions of territorial title are 
 
 
 
11 J. Allain, ‘On Coming toTerms with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ (2010) 12 JHIL 155, 159–160. 
12 The Times Literary Supplement 5 January 2011. 
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resolved by the law of the time when the territory was first acquired.At the same 
time, Allain appears to accept the immorality of British conduct. So, he says that 
the Schmittian understanding of sovereignty as ‘he who decides the exception’ 
rings true for the United Kingdom which sought to solve its Jewish Question at 
home while using Maxim guns abroad.13 
However, Allain does not continue to say that in 1948 Zionists were civilised 
and Palestinians ‘beyond the Pale’. Indeed Allain does not attempt to exercise his 
judgement as an international legal historian with respect to this second period. 
He mentions the chapter on the Arab-Israeli conflict only to note Kattan’s 
conclusions that Zionists were aggressive, hypocritical and their conduct unlawful. 
That is,Allain does not engage with the evidence presented – taking the two 
chapters together – 55 pages of text and 30-plus pages of notes.14 When he 
dismisses Kattan for not having an international legal historian’s sense of legal 
time, Allain refers only to the earlier period just considered in the review.15 
 
 
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE CREATION OF THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL 
 
These two phrases are the titles for chapters 7 and 9 of Kattan’s book. The 
reviewer’s starting point is that these events stand outside any regime of positive 
international law. The difficulty for Kattan the international lawyer, as distinct 
from Kattan the historian, is that he has to engage once again, as in the first part of 
his book, in eventually futile arguments about the legality or illegality of what 
has been happening to the Arab people of the Palestine Mandate. Kattan believes 
that international law can address the creation of Israel because it has plenty to 
say about the violation of the Mandate, the laws of war and the right of self-determination. 
Nonetheless, what appears to the reviewer really significant about 
9 
 
this book is that Kattan forces into the international law debate the following 
point. The manner in which the state of Israel came into existence entailed 
atrocities so grave as to undermine significantly, if not completely, in Kattan’s view, 
the legality of the state of Israel. Yet the fact of these atrocities is something for 
which international lawyers cannot plead ignorance (169). Of course they do in 
the sense that, as Kattan puts it: ‘It would seem that some scholars prefer silence, 
rather than critical engagement with a conflict that still resonates today’ (169).16 
This charge is central to the book. But, immediately, the point has to be made 
that the positivist tools of international law analysis are not, in any case, adequate 
to the situation which Kattan describes. This is because the origin of the State of 
 
 
 
13 ibid 158–159. 
14 As I have already argued this is a catastrophic error of presentation on Kattan’s part which shows 
that,however slipshod Allain’s criticism, there is real difficulty in applying international law standards 
to this conflict.The reason is the lack of clarity about the interrelation and inter-action of historical 
events and legal arguments- hence Kattan’s vacillation between text and footnotes. 
15 Allain, n 11 above, 159. 
16 A scholar whom Kattan does not cite or consider systematically and who appears to deal conceptually 
very clearly with the issues of depopulation of Arab Palestinians and repopulation by further 
Jewish immigration, is John Quigley, in The Case for Palestine, An International Law Perspective 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
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Israel is treated as a question of fact by international lawyers, and not regulated 
by law. Their arguments will be considered at a later stage of the review, after 
historical arguments about the events themselves are considered. It is the introduction 
of these historical arguments into a supposedly international law book 
which is the really radical and even devastating contribution of Kattan to the 
intellectual debate on the Israel/Palestine issue. Kattan himself recognises implicitly 
where the really significant arguments and research lie, by putting the 
historical argument in the text and virtually all of the legal doctrinal argument 
into fairly inaccessible and unreadable footnotes. 
What is at issue can be seen readily from the historian Caplan’s critique of 
Kattan. That is to say, it becomes a matter of evaluating the quality of historical 
scholarship and choosing among Israeli historians at odds with one another. So 
Caplan, of course, criticises Kattan’s bias, but qualifies this criticism by saying that, 
as a matter of historical judgement, considerable weight should be given to the 
historians upon whom Kattan relies, however personally irritating the reader may 
find Kattan’s own accompanying moralising. 
 
This is especially true of his [Kattan’s] wholesale condemnation of Zionists and 
Israelis for ethnic cleansing, atrocities and brutal territorial conquest during the 
fighting in 1947–49. Yet despite the overstatement, the evidence he presents is 
enough to constitute a legitimate counterweight to the widespread oversimplification 
that the Jews in Palestine were passive underdogs waging a totally defensive war 
against a massive organized assault perpetrated by Palestinian and Arab forces . . . 
Kattan subscribes to and reinforces the ethnic cleansing explanation of the refugees’ 
expulsion popularized by Ilan Pappé, adding his own moralistic chastising of the 
Zionists and the Israelis.17 
10 
 
 
 
The view that Kattan ‘states a case’ in a specifically historically effective way is 
also shared by Sujith Xavier in a detailed engagement which he makes with 
so-called academic arguments about lack of balance. Praising Kattan for providing 
the most complete historical picture yet by an international lawyer, he 
specifically takes issue with Allain’s dismissal of Kattan as part of a power game 
in which uncomfortable arguments are marginalised.18 In a review by an international 
lawyer, Paul deWaart, there is the following rather enigmatic concluding 
remark: ‘The author himself [ie Kattan] considers it to be an intriguing 
gaping hole in the literature that it is silent on the serious and difficult questions 
for international lawyers, which arise from the manner in which Israel achieved 
its statehood in 1948–49’.19 One might wonder why deWaart does not consider 
himself challenged by this charge of Kattan in an otherwise sympathetic four 
page review. 
 
 
 
17 TheTimes Literary Supplement n 12 above. Presumably Caplan’s reference to ‘moralizing’ is to Kattan’s 
talk about international law, ‘polemics in academic and legal garb’, showing, importantly, that 
international lawyers may have little credibility outside their own circles. Part of the problem of 
pinning down arguments of bias is how threadbare, and indeed silly, legal arguments may appear to 
non-international lawyers, applying ‘common sense’. 
18 Book review by S. Xavier, (2010) 11 German Law Journal 1038, 11042–1043, ie including Quigley’s 
The Case for Palestine n 16 above. 
19 Book review by P. deWaart, (2010) 23 Leiden Journal if International Law 967, 970. 
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The precise case to be stated against Israel, as Kattan the historian sees it, is 
whether the ‘events of, roughly November 1947 to January 1949 amounted 
to a conquest of Palestine by the Israelis, according to a ‘master plan’ which 
included the deliberate expulsion of the Arab people, or whether ‘although, 
numerous atrocities did occur, including expulsions, the Arab exodus was not 
premeditated by the Haganah but was an unintended consequence of the war’ 
(184). According to Kattan, Ilan Pappé, already mentioned by Caplan, takes the 
first view while Benny Morris takes the second view (184). Kattan does not 
want to engage directly with the debate between these historians (184), but 
prefers to list, through roughly 20 pages or so of text, and again, 8 pages of notes, 
a series of Israeli operations (170,171, 181–202, 331–333, 338–345).He relies on 
a very wide variety of sources and uses a number of direct quotations from key 
Jewish figures such as Hannah Arendt, David Ben Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin, to 
support an argument of a deliberate plan of expulsion. Kattan concludes with a 
substantial quotation from the British Foreign Office Archive, drafted to counter 
the Jewish claim that the British and Arab rulers are responsible for the flight of 
the Arabs: 
 
The facts are: 
(a) That very many fled before the Arab invasion of 15th May owing to the brutality 
and the atrocities of IZL [the Irgun] and Haganah, eg at Deir Yassin. This 
policy of intimidation had since been pursued fairly consistently. 
(c) Jewish settlers have systematically moved into houses and land of Arab 
11 
 
refugees[.] 
(d) Jews have obstructed United Nations efforts to obtain return of Arab refugees to 
their homes.20 
 
 
In his Partitioning Palestine, Legal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,21 
John Strawson recognises that the issue goes to the heart of the possibilities of 
resolving the conflict, ‘as proponents of the view that refugees were expelled as 
part of a Zionist plan tend to view Israel itself as the obstacle to peace.’22 Strawson 
deals with what Kattan calls the revisionist Israeli historical literature and remains 
skeptical about it. In considering a historian called Masalha, ignored by Kattan, 
Stawson objects to the idea that the ‘mainstream (Israeli) labour leaders’ could 
have had an ideological intent to make the exodus possible because ‘ideologies are 
incapable of possessing intention as intentions can only be possessed by an 
individual human being’.23 Then he argues against Morris, that any transfer plan 
could have been embodied in Zionist thinking from the beginning of Zionism 
in the 19th century until 1948. Instead, Ben-Gurion and others tried to think 
 
 
 
20 At (200), refering to a document dated 19 January 1949 FO 371/5367 Minute from Mr Reddaway 
to Mr Mayhew, requesting a statement of answers to inaccurate Jewish propaganda. 
21 J. Strawson, Partitioning Palestine, Legal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (London: Pluto 
Press, 2010). Oddly enough,Strawson was not driven by Roger van Zwanenberg, the editor of Pluto 
Press, to make an authorial confession. Strawson does not purport to offer more than a brief review 
of historical literature in the key sections relevant for the present review. 
22 ibid 138. 
23 ibid 139. 
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through power sharing with the Arabs.24 Strawson points also to Morris’s view 
that the refugee problem was ‘born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It 
was largely a byproduct of Arab and Jewish fears’.25 For some reason, Strawson 
does not address Morris’s latest work, 1948, A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, 
although it is in his bibliography.26 
Finally Strawson comes to Pappé, whom he characterises as taking ‘a deconstructionist 
hatchet’ to some key 1948 texts.27 Strawson accepts that the infamous 
Plan D provided for the expulsion of civilians, but asks was it part of a coordinated 
and systematic plan? In Strawson’s view Plan D ‘was based on a reasonable 
assessment that threats to the Jewish state would not come from a classical 
invasion . . . but that the strategy of the regular armies would be to link up with 
irregular and other armed groups already acting behind the lines.’ In other 
words, Pappé is wrong to speak of ethnic cleansing. This Plan D was military in 
conception. There would be a war with no front line and concern would be that 
a village could be used as a military base. Strawson concludes that there is no 
doubt that the Israeli Defense Force was involved in the expulsion of thousands 
of Palestinians from their homes. ‘The course of the battle seemed to dictate the 
intensity of these operations’.28 
Strawson’s central point is that the 1948 conflict showed the difficulty of 
making a distinction between civilians and military. Israel was fighting a defensive 
12 
 
war against countries which wished to destroy the Jewish state, ie Arab States 
which had been threatening to use force since 1946. Strawson continues: 
 
In Palestine . . . towns and villages became enemy bases. As a result military commanders 
began to view the civilians themselves as a factor in the fighting. Thus in 
the terms of Plan D Palestinian civilians living in enemy controlled areas became 
a justified target. According to this view by removing those civilians a military 
threat could be eliminated. The return of civilian Palestinians was also seen in this 
light . . .29 
 
It is necessary to offer some historical judgement and recommendations about 
the two cases stated by Kattan and Strawson. The work of Benny Morris will 
be considered first. Then there will be an examination of the work of Illian 
Pappé. The work of Morris and other revisionist Israeli historians is made 
possible since the mid-1980s because of the Israeli publication of their own 
official archives. The evidence comes mainly from Israeli military and especially 
intelligence records of the actual events. 
So Morris’s riveting narrative of the Civil War from November 1947 to May 
1948 and the international war from mid May 1947 until January 1949 shows 
overwhelmingly that a leaderless Arab community panicked in the face of the 
 
 
 
24 ibid 141. 
25 ibid 143, quoting Morris. 
26 B. Morris, 1948, A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven, Ct: Yale UP, 2008).This work 
will be discussed below. 
27 Strawson n 21 above, 144. 
28 ibid 147. 
29 ibid 148. 
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threat and presence of Israeli military action.30 The conclusion from Morris’s 
analysis is that clearly official Israeli political and military action was used to expel 
most of the 750,000 Palestinians who left their homes during the period of 
especially October 1947–October 1948.This was both within the area assigned 
to the Jews under the partition Resolution and in the areas that later fell within 
the Israel of the 1949 Armistice Lines. As for atrocities, Morris says that ‘Yishuv 
troops probably murdered some eight hundred civilians and prisoners of war – 
most of them in several clusters of massacres in captured villages’.31 This all 
happened within an institutional context of the abandonment of the Mandate 
territory by the mandatory Power and the absence of any immediate or subsequent 
intervention by the United Nations, or the international community. 
Morris points to the complete absence of any serious political or military 
coordination by the Arab Palestine community.32 He says, ‘The Palestinian Arabs, 
with well established traditions of disunity, corruption and organisational incompetence, 
failed to mobilise their resources.’33 So few young Palestinians actually 
participated in any of the battles and theYishuv was fighting not a ‘people’ but 
an assortment of regions, towns and villages. That is to say, no Palestinian village 
community or town ever came to the help of another. ‘One day, when the 
13 
 
Palestinians face up to their past and produce serious historiography, they will 
probe these parameters of weakness and irresponsibility . . .What this says about 
the Palestinian Arabs, at the time, as a “people” will also need to be confronted’.34 
There are parallels here with the argument of Efraim Karsh, that the refugees’ 
departure was due to the prior abandonment of Palestinian leadership responsibility.35  
They were unprepared for the events of 1947–48. 
Kattan has already drawn attention to the disagreements Morris has with 
Pappé. A major weakness of Kattan’s book is that he does not focus on their 
disagreements as his central issue from an international law, or a general legal 
perspective. Kattan thinks he can get around this by enumerating a whole series 
of incidents, but this will not of itself prove they are part of a preconceived plan, 
rather than merely the chaotic outcome of civil war among entities neither of 
which are yet fully fledged states. What is at issue becomes much clearer if one 
looks to Pappé’s central thesis, rather than using him, as Kattan does, to help 
enumerate a series of incidents. Pappé is obviously a contested historian. It is a 
position he himself examines at length in a recent autobiography published by 
Pluto Press.36 His major recent work The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine provides 
an alternative framework to the Arab Israeli Conflict of 1947–49 to the one 
provided by Strawson and Morris.37 It is worth mentioning also that Baruch 
 
 
 
30 Morris, n 26 above. 
31 ibid 406. 
32 ibid ‘Some Conclusions’ 392–420. 
33 ibid 399. 
34 ibid 400. 
35 E. Karsh, Palestine Betrayed (New Haven, Ct: Yale UP, 2010). In opposition there is the video 
testimony to which Kattan draws attention (170). 
36 I. Pappé, Out Of The Frame, The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Israel (London: Pluto Press, 2010). 
37 I. Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: One World Press, 2006). Again, this appears not 
to be a mainstream academic publisher. 
 
Anthony Carty 
© 2013 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited. (2013) 76(1) MLR 158–177 169 
 
 
[END OF PAGE 169] 
 
 
 
Kimmerling warns how Morris, in contrast, adheres so strictly to a positivist 
historiography that he ‘prefers to leave his moral and ideological attitude toward 
the events he described ambiguous . . . ’38 However, from a sociological perspective, 
Kimmerling – the author is a Professor of Sociology at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem – also presents the events of 1948 as a land seizure by 
force.39 So Kimmerling’s view reinforces Pappé. 
Pappé uses Israeli National Archives and especially private Israeli archives, 
diaries of key Israeli figures, particularly Ben Gurion, for the following argument. 
The Jewish leaders, particularly Ben Gurion, knew perfectly well that the Arabs, 
whether the Palestinians within the Mandate or the neighboring Arab states, 
constituted no real threat to the Jews. Arab hot air rhetoric was not at all matched 
with weapons and military skills. The only exception was Transjordan and the 
Jews were careful to come to an agreement with it to divide up Eastern Palestine 
– what is now the West Bank. Ben Gurion painted a public picture of an 
impending second holocaust, while privately, with his confederates – Pappé calls 
14 
 
them ‘The Consultancy’ – he exercised himself with reducing the Arab population 
of what was to be Jewish Palestine to less than 20 per cent. The records of 
the Consultancy meetings show that Plan D can only have had a population 
transfer intention in mind as there was no real military threat. Most importantly, 
in this connection, the Palestinian population did not wish to fight. They hoped 
to continue life as normal, wishing thereby to escape conflict, whatever changes 
of sovereignty took place. Jewish attacks upon them, orchestrated and directed by 
The Consultancy, were not reprisals but provocations to strike fear into – and 
drive to flight – a population which wished to continue with ‘business as usual’. 
A final element in the picture was that the speed of the British withdrawal 
and the irresponsible character of the UN Partition Resolution – offering 
immediate radical change without any mechanisms for implementation – 
completely upset the Arab preference for a much longer drawn out negotiation 
of a solution along the lines of a Palestinian State, the Mandate being granted 
independence, with guarantees for the Jewish minority, in October 1947, one 
third of the population.40 
Pappé’s conclusion was that security played no significant role in Jewish 
removal of the populations of Palestinian towns and villages. Morris’s conclusion 
about the absence of a Palestinian ‘people’ in 1948, and Karsh’s argument about 
lack of Palestinian leadership, are given parallel and compatible interpretation 
with Pappé’s argument that the Palestinians remaining in Palestine at the time 
were apolitical. That is, they hoped to survive as intact local communities under 
alien lordship, now of the Israelis, as so often before, whether under the Ottomans 
 
 
 
38 http://hnn.us/articles/3166.html (last visited 10 October 2012). Kimmerling actually highlights a 
strongly Zionist picture of Morris, someone favoring not only past but also future population 
transfers to the advantage of Israel. Kimmerling is the author of Zionism and Territory, The Socio- 
Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of 
California Press, 1983). From a sociological perspective – the author is a Professor of Sociology at 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem – Kimmerling presents the events of 1948 as a land seizure by 
force, especially in chapter 5, ‘From Money to Sword’. 
39 ibid especially in chapter 5. 
40 Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine n 37 above, 37–126, and notes, 266–275. 
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or the British. Finally, Pappé points to the consternation of the Palestinians at 
the rapidity of unregulated change which followed the passing of the General 
Assembly Resolution on partition in November 1947. The events which followed 
in the Mandate Territory after November 1947 represented a complete 
international institutional vacuum – the very absence of international legal order – 
hence the continued, general, international ignorance of these events until the 
present moment. 
 
 
WAS PALESTINE CONQUERED? 
 
Perhaps the most mainstream, recent, legal positivist interpretation of the events 
of 1947–48 comes from Roger O’Keefe. He presents three points. Firstly, the 
15 
 
inter-temporal rule requires that one judge matters by the standards of the time, 
not by today’s standards. Secondly, when Britain gave up the mandate, it was not 
substituted by a geographically coextensive independent state, an event for which 
there was no precedent in international law. Thirdly, and most importantly, in the 
absence of centralised international institutions, what is the authoritative legal 
characterisation of a fact is ‘a function as much of discerning how other states 
have adjudged these matters legally as [it is] of abstract juridical reasoning’.41 
O’Keefe says that, whatever rules there may have been on the use of force in 
1948, they could not be applied within the former Mandate territory, now an 
entity without legal status. So there was no principle of law which prevented the 
Jews, or for that matter the Palestinians from seizing as much of the former 
Mandate territory as they could – which they did.42 O’Keefe does not refer to 
any of the historical material which makes up Kattan’s book, although, as Kattan 
is at pains to insist, this material has been available for about twenty five years. 
O’Keefe insists that the rules on the use of force, under article 2/4 of the UN 
Charter only apply among states and not within the boundaries of a defunct 
Mandate. It is simply that article 2/4 would not protect any territory within the 
former Mandate territory from being incorporated into the state of Israel. 
O’Keefe might have tried to respond to the 1931 resolution of the Institut de 
Droit International on the legal significance of Mandates,43 which said: 
 
6. [. . .] The communities under Mandate are subjects of international law 
7. The functions of the mandatory end by renunciation or revocation of the 
Mandate . . . by the recognition of the independence of the community which has 
been under Mandate. 
8. [. . .]The rights and duties of the communities under Mandate are not affected by 
the expiration of the Mandate or the change of the Mandatory. 
 
However, Kattan places this document in a footnote and does not try to construct 
any extended argument from it. 
 
 
 
41 R. O’Keefe, ‘Israel/Palestine Sixty years On’ inT. Giegerich and A. Proelb (eds), Trouble Spots in the 
Focus of International Law (Berlin: Dunker-Humblot, 2010) 13, 14–15. 
42 ibid 18–24. 
43 Already mentioned by Kattan in a footnote of his book at 312. 
 
Anthony Carty 
© 2013 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited. (2013) 76(1) MLR 158–177 171 
 
[END OF PAGE 171] 
 
 
O’Keefe goes on to make a distinction between the ‘Jewish population of the 
territory’ and the state of Israel. At first, one could say the Jewish population of 
the territory of the defunct Mandate was not prohibited by international law 
from seizing as much land as they could. At a second stage, where this Jewish 
population becomes the State of Israel sometime between 14 May 1948 and 
February 1949, one can now say, somehow in addition, that there was no rule of 
international law that protected any territory of the former Mandate from being 
incorporated into the State of Israel.44 
Nor is any right the Palestinians may now have to self-determination applicable 
at that time because international law did not then recognise a right of 
self-determination. This is a reference by O’Keefe to the so-called inter-temporal 
16 
 
rule. Highly relevant in O’Keefe’s view is ‘the absence at the time of protests by 
third states, with the notable exception of the Arab bloc, at the incorporation into 
the state of Israel of the territories within the borders of the former Mandate’.45 
There was also no protest within the UN about Israel going beyond the Partition 
resolution recommendations.46 However, he also remarks: ‘At the same time, 
states generally refrained from explicitly recognising Israel’s asserted title to these 
lands.’47 He continues to say: ‘While formal recognition of Israel’s right to the 
territory claimed by it in 1949 remains rare, there nonetheless appears today to 
be general acquiescence in Israel’s assertion’.48 The position of most states is that 
the extent and delimitation of the frontiers is a matter for resolution in final status 
negotiations between Israel and representatives of the Palestinians. For this proposition 
O’Keefe relies upon exhortations from the Security Council in 1949, 
which, having declined to enforce the GA Partition Resolution, expressed hope 
for the early achievement of ‘agreement on the final settlement of all questions 
outstanding between the governments and authorities concerned’.49 There must 
be force in the contention that the rapid recognition of Israel by most states 
indicated an indifference to the circumstances of its birth. This is the ‘Juridical 
Power of the Factual’ and O’Keefe is not alone as an international lawyer in the 
general argument which he has made. As Eban argued in 1948, ‘[t]he existence of 
a State is a question of fact and not of law. The criterion of statehood is not 
legitimacy but effectiveness’.50 
Another important commentator is O’Keefe’s Cambridge colleague, James 
Crawford. Kattan engages particularly with him as possibly the leading authority 
on international law on the creation of states. Crawford argues that once Britain 
had relinquished the Mandate – which it could do through the approval of the 
UNGA Partition Resolution (181 II) – Palestine did not become a res nullius in 
1948. If it had, then the creation of Israel would have been one of original 
occupation. So, unlike O’Keefe, Crawford gives due weight to the presence of 
 
 
 
44 O’Keefe, n 41 above, 18–24. 
45 ibid 20. 
46 This is not true, as will be seen from the analysis of the UN record by Scobbie and Hibbin, see n 56 below. 
47 O’Keefe, n 41 above, 20 
48 ibid 20. 
49 ibid 21 citing SCR 79 (1949). 
50 n 2 above. 
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some sort of ghostly shell of a state on the territory of the Mandate, after the 
British departure, as the above cited Resolution of the Institute of International 
law would lead one to expect. He says that, in any case, the category of res nullius 
is of limited application and cannot apply where there is what Crawford calls an 
organised population.51 
In other words, he is not absolutely categorical, as is O’Keefe, that self-determination 
has no place in the events of the founding of Israel. Crawford does 
also say, self-determination – of presumably the Palestinians or the remaining 
people of the defunct Mandate – could not be an obstacle to the Israeli State’s 
creation, because self-determination was not established as a principle of international 
17 
 
law at the time.52 However, Crawford adds: 
 
And in any event, given the social and political situation in Palestine by that time, 
it was arguable that partition and the creation of two States was consistent with 
the principle of self-determination as applied to Palestine as a whole. Certainly 
the General Assembly proceeded on that basis in adopting the Partition 
Resolution.53 
 
Obviously these remarks appear to indicate that Crawford is aware of an 
international consensus, already reflected in the Partition resolution, that self-determination 
was naturally the principle applicable to the defunct Mandate’s 
population. It would naturally apply to both the Jews and the Palestinians 
and hence it could be quite natural – O’Keefe not withstanding – to talk of 
aggression by one people against the other, conquest and deprivation of the 
other people’s right of self-determination. 
However, Crawford appears to characterise the situation on the ground, 
during the events of 1947–48, as one of a struggle of the Jews to separate 
themselves from the Palestinians: 
 
Secession would thus appear to be the appropriate mode, and the question then 
becomes at what time Israel qualified as a seceding State . . . [I]n applying these 
criteria [which Crawford has discussed earlier in this chapter] . . .Palestine should be 
regarded as a single self-determination unit.54 
 
The Partition resolution could be taken to be concerned with this but, as 
Crawford has already argued, it lacked legal authority as a mere non-binding 
General Assembly Resolution and was not effective. So the Jewish struggle for 
separation was not the implementation of a legal self-determination principle, but 
merely a classical breakaway movement of a part of a state. So the lesser test of 
qualified effectiveness did not apply to Israel as a self-determining unit within the 
defunct Mandate, but rather the stricter test of stable and effective government of 
 
 
 
51 Crawford, n 2 above 432. 
52 ibid 434. 
53 ibid 434 Crawford cites in a footnote three academic publications as somehow relevant to these remarks. 
54 ibid 433. 
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territory, which Israel met by concluding an Armistice Agreement with Egypt in 
February 1949.55 So, Crawford says: 
 
It must be concluded that Israel was effectively and lawfully established as a state by 
secession from Palestine in the period 1948 to 1949. Its original territory was its 
armistice territory, not the partition territory.56 
 
 
Kattan’s comment on Crawford is that he is one of those international lawyers 
who choose ‘a diplomatic way of describing what transpired in Palestine in 1948 
without having to actually engage with the legal consequences of such a conclusion’. 
18 
 
57 Secession is not appropriate to describe what happened because the 
Zionists were not a minority trying to break away from the majority to create a 
Jewish state in a part of Palestine. 
Rather, the Zionists wanted as much of Palestine as they could get, with as few 
Palestinian Arabs in it as possible, including territories well beyond the UN Partition 
Plan’s boundaries to create their Jewish state. The Yishuv accomplished this through 
war, occupation and annexation after which the Provisional Government of Israel 
extended its administration and laws there. Israel’s title to Palestine is therefore based 
on conquest and annexation and not on ‘unilateral secession’ ‘auto-emancipation’ 
defensive conquest’ or any other novel term or legal fiction created by international 
lawyers to describe it.58 
However, this supposes Kattan accepts Pappé’s interpretation of events rather 
than Morris’s. Kattan, as has been seen, does not make any such categorical 
choice of historians in his own text, preferring to accumulate specific incidents 
of Jewish expulsion of Palestinians. Yet the idea of conquest requires the focused 
intention of some general actor. The present reviewer does make a choice for 
Pappé’s interpretation, taken together with Kimmerling’s. There was a deliberate, 
conscious plan of the Jewish leadership to seize land and vacate it of its existing 
population. Whether this plan was conceived long in advance of events in 
1947–48, or improvised as a response to opportunities presenting themselves, 
 
 
 
55 ibid. 
56 Iain Scobbie and Sarah Hibbin contest this assertion about the armistice line, although probably 
Crawford only wanted to say ‘at least the Armistice lines and not the Partition resolution lines.’ 
However, Scobbie and Hibbin point to the UN Official Records which show clearly that for its part 
Israel refused to accept the armistice lines as anything other than provisional, while when the 
General Assembly voted for the admission of Israel to the UN it drew attention to the implementation 
by Israel of Resolutions 181 and 194. See further, I. Scobbie and S. Hibbin, The Israel-Palestine 
Conflict in International law: Territorial Issues 2009 US/Middle East Project at http://www.soas.ac.uk/ 
lawpeacemideast/publications/file60534.pdf 61 commenting on Crawford, 58–64 on the Armistice 
Agreements, and 57 on the General Assembly admissions process (last visited 10 October 2012). 
57 at 240–241.While Scobbie and Hibbin do not attempt a history of the conflict on the ground their 
minute examination of UN records leads them to note the justification the Israelis gave for the 
inclusion of western Galilee. Since the Arab population had now left, they would not put at risk a 
Jewish majority in the state. Further, events had shown it was vital for Israel’s defense. The authors 
comment that this was the first time Israel appears to use the argument that defense considerations 
determined frontiers ‘but it also appears to contain an effacement of the rights of the indigenous 
Palestinian Arab population’ esp ibid 56, but also 55–56. 
58 ibid 241. 
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would not matter legally. The reviewer inclines to the latter sequence of events. 
The most impressive survey of events the reviewer has read is that of Morris. 
Kimmerling says that Morris adheres so strictly to a positivist historiography 
that he remains conceptually ambiguous about the larger picture. However, the 
reviewer found a full reading of Morris’s 1948, A History of the First Arab-Israeli 
War a quite devastating picture – taken from Israeli/Jewish intelligence and 
military archives – of a gradually increasing Jewish/Israeli sweeping of the 
Palestinians off their lands. They did not voluntarily leave. Morris describes them 
as being pushed. At the same time, Strawson’s point remains that the Jews/Israelis 
would have regarded these Palestinians as potential 5th columnists in the event of 
19 
 
an international Arab attack. Finally, there is arguably evidence, especially from 
Morris, that Jewish/Israeli actions were not fully coordinated. Varying decisions 
to expel or surround and detain Palestinians were taken by individual field 
commanders. 
Kattan does not address in any sustained or systematic way the representative 
view of O’Keefe and Crawford, that the principle of self-determination was not 
law in 1947–48, so that there could be no aggression against or conquest of the 
Palestinians at that time. He may assume that the people of the Mandate, in their 
entirety and as a single whole, had such a right, but, as he notes himself, mention 
of the right was deliberately excluded from the Mandate. The principle of 
self-determination is widely regarded as becoming law some time after 1960.59 It 
must surely be the case that the Great Powers did not regard themselves as bound 
by any such principle in 1919 or even 1947.As Kattan’s book amply shows, the 
Great Powers decided by 1919 to set up a Jewish community in the Palestine 
Mandate. The same Great Powers decided to accept in 1947–48 and continue to 
accept now, the State of Israel in that defunct Mandate. 
The main feature of Kattan’s book is that he puts before international lawyers 
the new research by Israeli historians about the events on the ground in the 
Mandate and after its lapse, from roughly November 1947 to January 1949.The 
reaction of one international lawyer, Paul deWaart is to ask whether the profession 
as a whole will ever address the facts on the ground in the founding months of 
1947–49.This is unlikely. Europe and North America are equally implicated with 
Israel in its foundational history and the security issues surrounding its continued 
survival. Kattan does not address directly the nature and power of historical fact, 
of collective memory, in this case, of the entire Western world. Instead, he is saying 
that what happened to the Palestinians in 1947–49 was illegal according to 
international law, presumably because conquest was then illegal. In that case why 
did the international community acquiesce in the founding of Israel and recognise 
it? There was, and appears to continue to be – also among international lawyers 
such as Crawford and O’Keefe – no felt need to readdress the events in Palestine 
in 1947–48.Will Kattan’s book change that? From reviews one can see that it is 
making some impact, but he does not provide legal guidance, as distinct from 
moral outrage and frustration with the international legal profession. 
 
 
 
59 See also, and generally, R. McCorquodale, ‘Negotiating Sovereignty: The Practice of the United 
Kingdom in regard to the Right of Self-Determination’ (1996) 66 British Yearbook of International Law 283. 
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It is necessary to address systemically the positivist character of international 
law if one wishes to achieve the conclusions that Kattan wants. It would be 
necessary for Kattan to argue that self-determination of peoples is an absolute 
principle of ius cogens, which no dominating state practice of Great Powers can 
contravene. This ius cogens should break the so-called Inter-temporal Rule for 
the acquisition of territory used by Colonial Powers to resolve disputes among 
themselves about dividing up the territories of non-Western peoples. In other 
words, international lawyers would have to undertake the conceptual work of 
20 
 
rejecting the whole complicity of international law in colonialism and thereby 
insist that empires and colonies were, from the start, illegal. For instance, this has 
been the position of China with respect to the unequal treaties founding the 
former British Colony of Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration of the UK and the 
PRC of 1984 contains no Chinese recognition of the legality of the Treaty of 
Nanking of 1842.60 Kattan would have to take the same position with respect to 
the Palestinians since 1920. 
The concept of ius cogens, taken from article 53 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties is purely formal. It provides that there cannot be any 
derogation from a norm accepted and recognised by the international community 
as peremptory. It might be objected that the principle of self-determination 
cannot be said to have come into existence as late as 1960, since it was the whole 
basis for the dismantling of Empires, from at least 1919. McCorquodale shows 
how self-determination was part of UK policy at least since 1918.61 However, 
the international community has certainly acquiesced in its non-observance on 
numerous occasions and any principle will depend upon interpretation before it 
can be implemented. 
The reviewer suggests, by way of conclusion, that the many questions left in 
the air by Kattan’s book could be made the subject of yet another request by 
the UN General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice. The campaigning tone of Kattan’s text would suggest such an 
avenue.62 It is conceivable that Palestine could find the support for such an 
initiative in the General Assembly. The Court might be asked the following 
questions: whether the principle of self-determination was recognised as 
binding at the conclusion of World War One, so that it should have been 
incorporated in the Palestine Mandate; whether, consequently the Palestine 
Mandate violated the principle of self-determination and the League of Nations 
failed to uphold it; whether the Jewish/Israeli political and military operations 
in the Mandate and later Israel during the civil conflict within the Mandate and 
during the international war up until Armistice Agreements were signed, constituted 
a violation of the principle of self-determination as applied to the 
Palestinian people; whether, consequently, the State of Israel came into existence 
 
 
 
60 http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm (last visited 10 October 2012). Paragraph 1 states that 
the Chinese resume sovereignty over Hong Kong, while paragraph 2 says that the UK restores Hong 
Kong to China. 
61 McCorquodale, n 59 above, 284. 
62 There is also the ongoing Russell Tribunal on Palestine, which is, obviously, a purely non-governmental body, not in 
any case a purely legal enterprise. http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/ (last visited 10 October 2012). 
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in violation of the principle of the self-determination of the Palestinian 
people; whether, in the alternative, the international community has recognised 
the existence of the State of Israel as an accomplished fact, broadly within the 
boundaries of the Armistice Agreements, so that any attempt to apply the 
principle of self-determination at present to the Palestinian question must not 
now operate retrospectively so as to upset the Inter-temporal Rule, itself an 
expression of what has already been agreed in the past by the international 
21 
 
community. Obviously these are questions which a mere book, or a mere 
book review cannot resolve. They require an international legal judgment of 
authority. 
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